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KAY P. KINDRED*
The face of poverty has changed considerably in this country over the past
twenty-five years.1 In the early 1970s the aged comprised the largest group of
poor people, but in the 1990s, children have displaced the elderly as the
poorest group. One in five children in this country-14.6 million-is poor. In
1992 more than one out of every five American children younger than eighteen
lived in a family whose income was below the poverty line. One in every four
children under six years of age is poor, nearly double the rates for adults ages
eighteen to sixty-four. Twenty-seven percent of children under age three live in
poverty. The number of poor children younger than eighteen years of age has
increased by five million-from 9.6 million to 14.6 million since 1973-while
the poverty rate of children has increased by one-half-from 14.4% to 21.9%.
Approximately one in every two poor children lives in extreme poverty, in
families whose income falls below half the federal poverty line. The average
poor family with children in 1992 had a total income of $7,541 or $5.40 per
person per day, or $37.80 per person per week.2
A variety of reasons have been advanced for the increase in the child
poverty rate: (1) the declining value of the minimum wage means that many
people work, but remain below the poverty level; (2) unemployment rates do
* Kay P. Kindred is an Assistant Professor of Law and the Deputy Director of the
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the College of William and Mary School of Law. An
earlier version of this paper served as the basis of a presentation at a conference on
children's rights held at Temple University School of Law in September, 1995.
1 The official definition of poverty used by the U.S. Census Bureau for annually
assessing the number of poor Americans sets poverty thresholds that take into account total
family income, family size, and an adjustment each year for inflation in consumer prices.
According to the official government definition of poverty, a family of four with less than
$14,335 of annual cash income in 1992 was considered poor. However, poor families'
incomes usually fall significantly below the official poverty threshold-an average of $6,289
below the threshold in 1992. The official poverty definition does not consider geographic
variations in cost of living; does not account for the value of "in-kind" help such as food
stamps and housing assistance received by families, or for the impact of federal taxes, or for
income lost due to high medical bills, child care, or other expenses. See ARLoc SHERMAN,
WASTING AMERICA's FUrURE: THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND REPORT ON THE COSTS OF
CHLmD POvERTY 3, 7 (1994) [hereinafter, CHILDREN'S DFmENsE FUND].
2 /d. at xvi.
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not reflect the growing number of employed people who work only part-time
because full-time work is unavailable; (3) high unemployment persists in the
inner cities particularly among minorities and young workers; (4) the
increasing numbers of female-headed, single-parent households are particularly
burdened in overcoming poverty; and, (5) inadequate government welfare
programs fail to raise many families out of poverty. 3
As a matter of social and economic policy, the family is regarded not only
as the appropriate institution for provision of the love and affection necessary
for the proper development of the child, but also as the institution responsible
for provision of the economic and material needs of the child.4 Current
constitutional theory comports with this premise. The Supreme Court has long
interpreted the Constitution as creating a zone of privacy that insulates families
from state intrusion.5 The constitutional right to family integrity encompasses
the autonomy of adults in marriage and in family matters such as procreation
and childrearing. 6 It protects the right of parents to the care and companionship
of their children and the corresponding right of children in their parents. 7
Although the Court has repeatedly upheld a right to family privacy, it has not
construed the Constitution to impose on government the obligation to fund the
3 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at 5; see also Daan Braveman, Cdldren,
Poverty and State Constitaions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577, 577-85 (1989); Peter B. Edelman,
Toward a Copprehensve Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEo.
LJ. 1697, 1722-24 (1993).
Contrary to popular stereotypes, although past and continuing racial discrimination in
employment, housing, and education contribute to making Black and Latino children more
likely to be poor than non-Latino White children, the nwnber of poor non-Latino White
children (6.0 million) is considerably larger than the number of poor Black children (4.9
million) or poor Latino children (3.1 million). In addition, more poor children live outside
cities-in suburban and nonmetropolitan smaller cities and rural areas than in major cities.
Further, poor families no longer tend to be large families; the average poor family with
children consists of an average of 2.2 children, only slightly larger than the average of 1.9
children in all families. CmLDREN's DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at 5.
4 See DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 322 (1994); see e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 63.1-249 to 63.1-274.10 (Michie 1995); N.Y. JuD. § 413 (McKinney 1995).
5 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965) (Harlan, L and White,
J., concurring) (recognizing a limited substantive due process fundamental right to privacy).
6 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154-56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-85 (1965); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1923);
see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (plurality decision)
(recognizing a substantive due process fundamental right to make choices concerning family
living arrangements).
7 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 647-52 (1972).
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exercise of that right.8 Implicit in the Court's interpretation of family privacy is
the notion that family integrity is best protected when the family is shielded
from state interference, even when that interference is beneficent. Thus,
prevailing constitutional doctrine does not recognize a right of families to state
assistance, even when such assistance is necessary to protect and maintain
family integrity.
Under the common law doctrine of parens patriae the state has an
obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of children. Despite the weight
imparted in both law and social policy to the parent-child relationship and to
the values of family privacy, the state, in the proper exercise of its power as
parens patriae, can require parents to provide proper food, clothing, shelter
and medical care to their children. 9 Parental failure in that regard can lead to
the removal of children from their parents' care.
Current constitutional theory balances the right to family integrity against
the state's power as parens patriae by characterizing that right as one of
noninterference by the state in family matters absent a showing of compelling
state interest in preventing criminal conduct o or protecting children from
parental harm.II State statutes that allow for the removal of children from their
parents for neglect are considered proper manifestations of the exercise of that
power. 12
In this Article, I argue that poor parents who are willing, but economically
unable, to provide proper care for their children are entitled to some minimum
level of state assistance grounded in the constitutional right to family integrity.
The right to family integrity, when coupled with the state's power as parens
patride, creates an affirmative obligation on the state to provide income
assistance to impoverished families when necessary to protect the welfare of the
children and maintain the family intact.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I reviews the limitations to a
right to state assistance under current constitutional doctrine. Part HI discusses
development of the family privacy right and the parens patriae doctrine. Part
III considers how the exercise of state authority to protect needy children has
tended to operate in such a way as to undermine the integrity of impoverished
families to the detriment of poor children. The state has an affirmative
8 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
472-74 (1977) (holding that a state cannot create obstacles to prevent a woman from
exercising her freedom of choice concerning abortion; however, there is no obligation on
the state to provide equal funds for indigent childbirths and abortions).
9 See supra text accompanying note 4.10 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
11 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978).
12 See infra note 50.
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obligation to provide some minimum level of assistance to poor families arising
from the intersection of the family privacy right and the state's common law
duty as parens patriae, when maintaining the family unit is in the best interest
of the child. Finally, Parts IV and V examine the benefit of revisiting the issue
of an assistance entitlement for poor families in light of some current proposals
for welfare reform.
I. DocTRiNAL LIMITATIONS ON A THEORY OF
ENTTLEENT TO MINIMUM SUPPORT
Consideration of the possibility of a constitutionally-based right to
entitlements-nutrition, shelter, health care-is not new. During the past
twenty-five years, legal scholars have debated whether the federal Constitution
supports the notion of judicially enforceable substantive rights that would
compel expenditure of government funds to address the economic needs of the
poor. 13 Such arguments run counter to traditional precepts that view the
Constitution as a charter of negative rights that restrain government from
certain conduct, rather than a charter of positive rights that impose affirmative
obligations upon government to act. 14 The Supreme Court has adhered to the
negative rights philosophy and, thus, has rejected arguments asserting an
13 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Ten-Foreword On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969)
(suggesting that government has an affirmative duty under the Constitution to provide for
minimum support for the poor); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL
LAW§ 11-4. (1978); Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections of the Constiutional Justice
of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1108-10 (1986); Peter B. Edelman, 7he Next
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASnNGS L.. 1, 3
(1987); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 659, 659; Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 783-85 (1964)
(arguing that welfare rights should be viewed as property and, as such, should be entitled to
the same protections as other property rights); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE LJ. 1245, 1252-53 (1965). But see
Robert H. Bork, The kpossibility of Findng Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695-96.
14 "[Tihe Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties; it tells the
state to let people alone. It does not require the federal government or the state to provide
services." Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1049 (1984); see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 196 (1989). For an insightful critique of the negative rights view of the Constitution,
see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2271 (1990);
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Citique of a Negative Rights
View of the Constitution, 43 VAN. L. REV. 409 (1990).
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affirmative governmental obligation under the federal Constitution to expend
funds to provide resources for the poor. 15
Arguments asserting federal constitutional rights to meet the needs of the
poor have rested on equal protection or due process grounds. In Goldberg v.
Kelly, 16 the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that a pretermination evidentiary hearing be held when
welfare benefits are to be discontinued. Although the Court accepted the notion
of welfare benefits as property, 17 and found that "[s]uch benefits are a matter
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them,"18 it did not
reach the question of the existence of an affirmative duty on the state under the
Constitution to provide some minimal degree of assistance.
In Dandridge v. Wdliams, 19 decided only two weeks after Goldberg, the
Court considered the validity of the method by which the state of Maryland
distributed benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program (AFDC)20 under an equal protection analysis. According to AFDC
procedures, each state determines the standard of need for each eligible family.
Maryland had adopted a "maximum grant" program by which it would provide
grants to most families in full based on the computed standard of need, but with
a ceiling for the total amount any one family could receive. The standard of
need was based on the number of children in the family and the circumstances
under which the family lived. The standard of need increased with each
additional person in the household, but the increments became proportionally
smaller and the aggregate could not exceed the maximum limit.21
The plaintiffs were all members of large families whose calculated standard
of need exceeded the maximum grant they actually received. They argued that
the maximum grant limitation operated to discriminate against them based on
the size of their families in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the maximum grant denied
benefits to younger children in a large family. Moreover, they argued that in
limiting the amount of money any single household could receive, the State's
15 ee, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3051-53
(1989); Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1973).
16 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
17 "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than
a 'gratuity.'" / L at 262 n.8.
18 d. at 262.
19 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
20 42 U.S.C. § 601-617 (1994).
21 Dandidge, 397 U.S. at 473-75.
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maximum grant regulation encouraged the breakdown of families as parents of
large families "farmed out" their children to live with relatives.22
Applying a rational basis test,23 the Court concluded that Maryland's
maximum grant regulation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the Court acknowledged that the maximum grant program resulted in
the per capita diminution of benefits to children in large families, 24 and that the
system may provide incentive for a parent to send a child away from the
immediate family to live with relatives, 25 it found no constitutional violation.
The Supreme Court held that in matters of social welfare programs, as with
economic regulation of business and industry, the Constitution imposes only
limited restraint. Although "[tihe administration of public welfare assistance
.. involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," 26
if the classification made by the state has "some reasonable basis," courts must
defer to legislative and administrative judgments in the allocation of public
assistance, notwithstanding the resulting system may be unjust or inhumane.27
Six years later, in Lavine v. Mllne,28 the Supreme Court expressed more
definitively its position on a constitutional entitlement to minimum subsistence.
A New York welfare statute provided that anyone who voluntarily terminated
employment would be disqualified from receipt of benefits for a period of
seventy-five days following the termination.29 A person who applied for
assistance within the seventy-five days after voluntarily terminating
employment would be deemed to have terminated employment for the purpose
of qualifying for assistance. 30 The statute placed the burden of presenting
evidence to the contrary on the applicant. The lower court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, finding that the statutory presumption that an applicant who
voluntarily terminated his employment did so for a wrongful reason violated
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. 31 The Supreme Court reversed.32
Although under the facts of the case it was not necessary for the Court to
address the broader question of a constitutional right to minimum support, the
22 UL at 476-77.
23 "In the areas of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Id. at
485.
24 1& at 478.
25/ at 479-80.
26 RL at 485 (emphasis added).
27 Hd at 485, 487.
28 424 U.S. 577 (1976).
29 Id. at 578-79.
30 Id. at 579.
31 Id. at 581-82.
32 Id. at 582.
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Court, in an opinion by Justice White, reached out to do so. Citing Dandridge,
the Court said "[w]elfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and neither the
state nor federal government is under any sort of constitutional obligation to
guarantee minimum levels of support." 33 This pronouncement seemed to
effectively close the door on arguments for a minimum assistance entitlement.
I. THE RIGHT OF FAMILY INTEGRITY AND THE PARENs PATRJAE
DocRN: WHERE CONSTmmONAL AND
COMMON LAW DomE MEET
A. An Intersection of Competing Principles
Freedom of choice in marriage and family relationships is a central tenet of
our jurisprudence. 34 Since its early due process cases dealing with the
education and rearing of children, 35 the Supreme Court has demonstrated
repeatedly that matters incident to marriage and to the establishment and
maintenance of family life are fundamental and, thus, entitled to constitutional
protection. 36 Personal choice with respect to decisions to marry,37 to
procreate,38 to bear children, 3 9 to choose family living arrangements,40 and to
direct the education and upbringing of children4' are among the rights
33 k1. at 584 n.9.
34 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a statutorily
defined "family" was held unduly restrictive of the right to choose family living
arrangements). Moore interprets the line of Supreme Court cases dating from Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), as establishing the constitutional right to freedom of choice
in matters of marriage and family life. See generally JOHN NowAK & RONALD ROTuNDA,
Com rioNALLAW§14.28 (Sth ed. 1995).
35 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
36 "D[The custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder... [There exists a] private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted).
37 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
38 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
39 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
41 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
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protected by the Constitution. Further, the Constitution protects not only the
individual rights of parents from arbitrary governmental intrusion, but also the
privacy right of the family unit itself.42
The state cannot intervene in matters of the family without establishing a
compelling interest to do so, but the family is not beyond regulation in the
public interest.43 When acting to protect the general welfare of children, the
state has wide latitude to restrict parental control. 44 This state power, known as
the parens patriae doctrine, in essence, gives the state authority to serve as a
substitute parent and ultimate protector of children's interests.45
(1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
42 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("[Flreedom
of personal choice in matters of... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) ("The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential' .... The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[The Court's early
due process] decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."). See generally Cheryl M. Browning & Michael L. Weiner, Note, The Right to
Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination
Proceedings, 68 GEo. L.J. 213 (1979).
43 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
44 The Supreme Court has described the state's interest in protecting the welfare of
children as "traditional and transcendent." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990);
see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See generally Marsha Garrison, (2id
Welfare Dedcsiomnaling: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEo. LJ. 1745
(1987).
45 The doctrine of parens palriae originated several centuries ago in Anglo-American
common law. Acknowledged as a part of equity jurisdiction in seventeenth century
England, it is said to emanate from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects
who were unable to protect themselves. The concept was used reportedly for the first time
in 1696 in Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep. 814, 818 (1696), where it was held that with
the dissolution of the Court of Wards, which had been established by Henry VIII in 1540,
the "pater pauiae" responsibility of the King for the care of charities, infants, idiots, and
lunatics returned to the Chancery. The parens patriae power was gradually expanded to
justify court interference to protect wards from the misdeeds of testamentary guardians,
Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (1721), and later to protect a child from exploitation
by third parties, Butler v. Freeman, 27 Eng. Rep. 204, 204 (1756). It was not until In re
Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937, 938-939 (1847) that a court held that intervention to protect a
child from his parent or guardian was proper in the absence of property.
The parens pariae power has been recognized from earliest times in the United States
as well and now is largely governed by state statutes. See People v. Mercein, 8 Paige 47
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While it is generally presumed in the United States that a child's overall
growth and development is enhanced by living with her biological parents, 46 in
the case of abused or neglected children, the child's well-being often
necessitates intervention by the state in the parent-child relationship. Under its
parens patriae power, the state may remove an abused or neglected child from
his or her parents' home and may, under certain circumstances, permanently
terminate all relationships and rights between parent and child. 47 The state's
compelling interest in preventing harm to children justifies intrusion on the
constitutional right to parental custody.48
B. Intersecting Principles in Operation
Child welfare cases are decided under the neglect jurisdiction of juvenile
courts nationwide.49 These proceedings are instituted to protect children who
(N.Y. 1839). For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of
parenspatiae, see Lawrence B. Custer, The Cigins ofParens Patnae, 27 EMoRY L.J. 195
(1978).
46 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions."); see also 1 WLLiAM
BLA OOE, CoMBmTARmS ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 147 (1897) (stating that the law
has historically recognized that the natural bonds of affection between parent and child lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children).
47 The Constitution requires clear and convincing evidence of actual harm to a child
before a state may terminate a parent's right to the care, control, and custody of a child.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); see In re )William L., 383 A.2d 1228
(Pa.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
48 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
49 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie 1988).
[Elach juvenile and domestic relations district court shall have, within the limits of
the territory for which it is created, exclusive original jurisdiction... over all cases,
matters and proceedings involving... [t]he custody, visitation, support, control or
disposition of a child... who is alleged to be abused [or] neglected... [w]hose
custody, visitation or support is a subject or controversy or requires determination...
The authority of the juvenile court to adjudicate matters involving the custody,
visitation, support, control, or disposition of a child shall not be limited to the
consideration of petitions filed by [a parent or legal guardian] but shall include petitions
filed at any time by any party with a legitimate interest therein ....
I. For a general discussion of child abuse and neglect procedures, see Michael S. Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Culdre: Standards for Removal of Gildren
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Odldren in Foster Care, and Temination of
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are not being adequately cared for by their parents. The juvenile court makes
both a jurisdictional and a dispositional judgment in such cases. The court
assumes jurisdiction based not on specific harms to the child, but on such
descriptive criteria as observed parental behavior or apparent neglect or abuse
of the child. Once jurisdiction is established, the court investigates the specifics
of the case and reaches a disposition based upon the standard known as "the
best interest of the child." If a court finds that a child has been abused or
neglected,50 the court may leave the child in parental custody, but under the
supervision of a court-appointed guardian, or it may commit the child to the
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976).
50 Statutory definitions of "abuse" and "neglect" vary widely from state to state. The
language of some statutes is very general, defining abuse as physical injury, sexual abuse,
or maltreatment. For example, the Virginia statute states that abused or neglected child
means any child... [w]hose parents or other person responsible for his care creates or
inflicts, threatens to create or inflict, or allows to be created or inflicted upon such child
a physical or mental injury by other than accidental means, or creates a substantial risk
of death, disfigurement, or impairment of bodily or mental functions ... neglects or
refuses to provide care necessary for his heath... abandons such child... [or]
commits or allows to be committed any act of sexual exploitation or any sexual act...
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2 (Michie 1995)(emphasis added).
Others spell out with greater detail the kinds of conduct which may constitute abuse or
neglect. For example, in Colorado child abuse or neglect
means an act or omission in one of the following categories which threatens the health
or weare of a child ... skin bruising, bleeding, maluarition, failure to thrive, bums,
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death ... sexual
assauk or molestation, sexual exploitation, or prostitution ... [any case in which] the
child's parents, legal guardian, or custodian fails ... to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, [or] medical care...
COLO. REV. STAT. §19-3-303 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
Child abuse and neglect are qualitatively different issues. Child abuse involves the
intentional physical, mental or emotional harm a parent inflicts upon a child. Child neglect
involves the failure of parents to properly care for the child, thereby endangering the child's
health and well-being. It includes those circumstances in which the parents do not have
sufficient economic means to furnish adequate food, medical care, clothing, shelter, etc. See
also LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 168.
In this Article, I focus on the neglected child and use the term "neglect" to refer to
instances in which parents are unable to provide adequate care for their children as a result
of indigence.
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local child welfare agency for placement in foster care51 if no alternative is
available. 52
Law and policy experts have long debated whether or not the neglect
jurisdiction of juvenile courts should be broadened to allow for increased state
intervention on behalf of "neglected" children. 53 That continuing polemic
exceeds the scope of this Article. However, there is substantial evidence to
suggest that, except in cases involving very seriously harmed children, a child's
situation is rarely improved through coercive state intervention. 54 This is
particularly true when, as is most frequently the case, intervention takes the
form of removal from the parental home, often placing a child in a more
51 "The term 'foster care' is [used generally] to apply to any type of care that
substitutes others for the natural parent in the parental role, including group homes... and
institutions, as well as foster family homes." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform. 431 U.S. 816, 823 n.8 (1977).
52 A state may coercively intervene to protect a child either by ordering that a child be
removed from her home or by ordering her parents to accept supervision and treatment as a
condition of continued custody. Either form of intervention is, to a greater or lesser degree,
an intrusion on parental autonomy.
53 Some commentators have supported broader powers for juvenile courts and
increased intervention. See, e.g., STANLEY KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAI. 61-62 (1971)
(supporting increased intervention but also documenting many actual and potential abuses
from state intervention); MAX WALD, PROTECrivE SERVICES AND EMOTIONAL NEGLECT
(1961); Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, Fily Law, 34 1. AM. TRiAL LAW. ASS'N
285 (1972). Others have criticized state intervention and advocated narrowing the reach of
neglect laws. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDsTEN ET AL., BEoFa THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTs OF THE CHILD
(1973); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARv. EDUC. REv.
599 (1973); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Odidren. A Search
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975); Symposium, The Relationship
Between Promise and Performance in State Intervention in Family Life, 9 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 28 (1972).
54 See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 20
(1973) ("[Slo far as the child's emotions are concerned, interference with [parental ties],
whether to a 'fit' or 'unfit' psychological parent is extremely painful"); see also HOUSE
Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW OF ma ENTrrLEMENT
PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1991); WHrrE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, THE RIGHTS OF
CHiLDREN: REPORT OF FoRUM 22 (1970); SHELDON WHnTE, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR
YOuNG CHLDREN: REVfIE AND RECOMm ATioNS (1973); Michael Mushlin, Unsafe
Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster CM'ldren from Abuse and Neglect,
23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988); Laura Oren, Deshaney's Unfinished Business:
The Foster Gi/ds Due Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113 (1990); Elizabeth A.
Sammann, The Reality of Family Preservation Under Norma v. Johnson, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 675 (1992); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" tiildren: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 993-1000 (1975).
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detrimental environment.55
Although there is a general lack of consensus as to standards establishing
what constitutes neglect or when a court should declare a particular child as
neglected,5 6 poverty is a common characteristic of families charged with
neglect. 57 Evidence suggests that the state routinely intercedes in poor families
55 See supra note 54. A 1986 national survey of foster family abuse and neglect
indicated reported cases of abuse were over ten times greater for foster children. RYAN E.
MCFADDEN, NATmNAL FOUNDATmNCARE FOUNDATiON PRojEcr: PREvENIG ABUSE IN
FAmy FOSTER CARE (1986).
Some experts argue that intervention may have harmful effects even when it consists of
measures short of removal, as for example, in-home supervision. "The presence of a
caseworker supervising parental behavior can interfere with the psychological system of the
family." Wald, supra note 53, at 999; see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTIREsTS OFTHE CHILD 52 (1973) (stating that a parent labeled neglectful and subjected to
outside control and supervision of parental performance, may experience "harmful and
threatening discontinuity by leaving the decision for placement open and subject to special
challenges ....").
5 6 The broad range of statutory standards across the fifty states is indicative of the
variation in neglect practices of juvenile courts. See, e.g., supra note 50.
Generally, many experts have recommended development of rule-oriented standards
for removal, eliminating the wide discretion currently permitted enforcers of abuse and
neglect laws:
Professionals have long wrestled with the problem of developing rule-oriented
standards for child removal. Mnookin, Wald and others have argued for a standard that
would retain the child at home unless a clear and present danger exists to the child's
well-being. Mnookin holds that before removal occurs, evidence of physical harm must
be demonstrated by an explanation of why intervention with the child remaining at
home would not be possible .... Wald ... has proposed that state intervention is
legitimate in cases where the child has suffered either serious physical harm, serious
and specifically defined emotional damage, or sexual abuse, or where the child is in
imminent physical danger .... Mhe level of proof [would] vary depending upon the
harm in question (i.e., physical abuse would require less proof than emotional damage).
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit... advocate limiting the coercive arm of the state to
those cases where the child faces "imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm."
Advocates of strict legal standards suggest that removal is justified only if the parents'
past behavior... caused or was capable or causing "serious harm."
LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 175; see also Wald, supra note 53.
57 See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Chld Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887,888 (1975).
Ihere is little consensus about when a court should find that a particular child is
neglected or abused. Parents convicted on neglect in one community might never have
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and that poor children are more likely to end up in the foster care system than
are children of other classes.58 Reasons for the disproportionate numbers
been brought to court in another. Perhaps the most prevalent characteristic of families
charged with neglect is poverty; this raises the troubling possibility that class or cultural
bias plays a significant role in decisions to label children neglected.
Id; Stanley S. Herr, Cidren Wthout Homes: Rights to Education and to Fwmly Stability,
45 U. MIA) L. RLa. 337, 366 (1990-91) ("Removal of children from their parents on the
basis of homelessness or poverty alone is anathema to . . . constitutional principles and
freedoms. Regrettably, such unlawful and unnecessary separations are a common
occurrence."); LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 153-54.
'Standards and statutes for the removal of a child from his or her parents are
broad, vague, and inconsistent. There are no clear definitions of 'neglected' children
and 'fit' or 'unfit' parents. Hence, parents, children, and foster parents are subject to a
rule of wide discretion and subjective determination.' Our findings suggest that an
underlying guideline does exist, although it may not be stated explicitly... adequacy of
income .... The most disturbing aspect of the wide discretionary power that child
welfare authorities currently wield in removing children is that the results are unfair and
discriminatory. Too often, child removal has been limited to poor families. Less than
one fourth of the children removed from their families and placed in foster care are
from financially self-supporting families."
Id, (citations omitted).
5 8 
"[Foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of
the poor... [The] disproportionate resort to foster care by the poor and victims of
discrimination doubtless reflects in part the greater likelihood of disruption of poverty-
stricken families." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 833 (1977).
A national study conducted in 1986 by the National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect
found that children from families of less than $15,000 were reported to child protective
services and other similar agencies as maltreated at five times the rate of other children. See
Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirnative Duties Toward Children Under a Post-DeShaney
Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 227, 228 n.7 (1990); see also Herr, supra note 57, at 340
n.10-13, 342-43.
It has been suggested that the disparate treatment of poor families in the neglect process
may be rooted in part in a perspective derived from its early English heritage in the
Elizabeth Poor Law, 43 Eliz. 1 (1601). The Poor Law, a comprehensive program of
legislation designed to provide relief to the poor, became the model for the next three
centuries in America as well as England. It established a dual 'standard of law for families.
State intervention between parent and child in poor families was not only permitted but
encouraged as a means to realize other public policy goals, ranging from the provision of
welfare relief at moderate public cost to the prevention of crime. For other classes, the state
would remove children from parents only in the most extreme situations and then only upon
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vary.59
One primary reason may be that definitions of neglect encompass many
behaviors and circumstances that are direct results of poverty. 60 For example, a
child with inadequate nutrition clothing or hygiene may be considered a victim
of physical neglect. Neglect cases may include cases of failure to thrive-a
condition that often reflects poverty's symptoms, such as a lack of healthy
food, parental stress and noisy and distracting living conditions. 61 Delays in
getting immunizations or health care for a child-delays which may result from
a lack of funds or medical insurance, a lack of transportation, or a lack of
opportunity to reach clinics which may only be open during the parents
working hours-are by-products of poverty that can result in a finding of
neglect. 62
Poverty-related circumstances can put children at increased risk of harm
from persons other than their parents which can also serve as the basis of a
neglect finding. For example, poor working parents who cannot afford
adequate child care may be forced to leave their children unattended or with
inexperienced caretakers, or in other unsafe child care arrangements. 63
Similarly, families living in inadequate housing or who are homeless are
frequently charged with neglect. 64
In addition, as a consequence of their greater dependency on public
agencies for the provision of social services, the poor are subject to far greater
privately initiated court action. See Areen supra note 57, at 894-96, 899. For a modem
reflection of similar public policy perspectives with respect to the poor see infra text
accompanying notes 89-90.
59 Though most poor parents provide loving, nurturing care for their children, it is true
that coping with the stresses caused by poverty can, in the extreme, drive some parents to
abuse or neglect their children. While the problems of child abuse and neglect exist in
families at all income levels, studies show that such problems occur at a higher rate among
poor families.
According to a study of the national incidence and prevalence of child abuse and
neglect undertaken by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect in 1986, the rate of neglect for children in families with annual
incomes below $15,000 was 36.8 per 1,000-9 times more than in higher income families
(4.1 per 1,000). Low-income children were labeled neglected more often for neglect of all
types, including physical, educational, and emotional neglect. See CHILDREN's DEFENSE
FUND, supra note 1, at 85-86; but see supra note 57 and infra text accompanying notes 61-
65.
60 See supra note 50.
61 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at 87.
62
63 Id.
64 See generally Herr, supra note 57.
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scrutiny of their family lives than are wealthier families who have the necessary
means to purchase private social services. Therefore, the family problems of
the indigent come to the attention of child welfare agencies at a
disproportionate rate.65
Despite statutory safeguards technically excusing parents who are unable to
provide for their children through no fault of their own, 66 distinctions are
seldom made in practice. State protective agencies routinely rely on neglect
statutes to remove children from the homes of parents who are too poor to
support them. Statutes typically define neglect primarily in terms of parental
conduct or home environment, with no requirement for a showing of actual
harm.67 Consequently, the inability to provide adequate food and housing can
trigger a neglect finding and a court-ordered removal to foster care. 68 And, for
lack of any meaningful alternative, many impoverished parents, when faced
with unemployment, sudden homelessness, or other economic emergency,
voluntarily surrender their children for foster care placement. 69 But whether by
court order or voluntary placement, once a child enters foster care the parent
relinquishes custody and the concomitant right to play an active role in
decisions affecting the child's daily life and care.70 Further, poor families face
particular disadvantage once they become involved in neglect or dependency
proceedings in the juvenile court system. Their economic situation can create
both practical and political barriers to the reunification of their families. For
example, when children are placed in foster care, parents who rely on AFDC
or public housing to make ends meet lose their benefits. AFDC allowances are
terminated when children are no longer in the home. Without AFDC, a parent
may be unable to pay rent. Or, a family that lives in subsidized housing may
lose its placement if the children remain out of the home for an extended
period. Without safe and stable housing, the children will not be returned to
their parents. 71
65 See Sinden, supra note 58, at 228 n.7.
66 See e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §1012(t) (1995).
67 See e.g., Jenkins v. Winchester Social Servs., 409 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1991);
see also Wald, supra note 53, at 1000.
68 /d. See generally Herr, supra note 57.
69 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977). Some commentators suggest that the "coercive undertones" of so-called
voluntary placements may lead parents to believe they have little choice but to surrender
custody. See, e.g., Oren, supra note 54; Sammann, supra note 54.
70 &ni, 431 U.S. at 827.
71 See generally Randal E. Steckel, 14 ABA Juv. & CHLD WELFARE L. REP. 138
(1995).
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I1. THE INTERSECTION OF PRINCIPLES AS A BASIS FOR AN
ASSISTANCE ENTITLEMENT?
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the manner in which the state
exercises its parens patriae power with respect to poor children has resulted in
the construction of policies and practices that inevitably undermine family ties
and ultimately work to the detriment of children of impoverished families.
Notwithstanding the importance to a child's emotional and psychological
development derived from being raised in a stable family, 72 and irrespective of
research documenting serious problems with the foster care system,73 state
child services agencies and the juvenile courts routinely rely on neglect statutes
to remove children from the homes of impoverished parents. 74 The state
continually intrudes on the privacy of poor families without enhancing the poor
child's welfare. 75
72 See generally A. LEON HIGGINO HAM, JR., AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A
NATIoNAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL AcTioN, A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE
UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEnt FAmiLmS (1993) (describing children's
problems in poverty, child care, housing, education, health care, child support, legal
representation, and the juvenile justice system).
Studies have shown that the denial of parental love and compassion can diminish the
capacity for development of those qualities in children raised in foster care. LINDSEY, supra
- note 4, at 58.
73 See supra notes 54-55; see also LnDEY, supra note 4, at 47-60.
74 Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Matwity, Difference, and Mystery: OdIldren's
Perspectives in Law, 36 ARmZ. L. REv. 11, 46 (1994). The average estimated monthly
number of children in foster care more than doubled from 97,000 in 1982 to 197,000 in
1991. Sammann, supra note 54, at 2; see HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note
54, at 17-24.
75 Continued reliance on foster care is likely attributable to two factors. First, a child's
stay in foster care is in theory a temporary measure until the child can be returned to live
with his or her biological parents. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). In reality, short term foster care is the exception, rather
than the rule. Children regularly remain in foster care for years at a time, often moved
multiple times from one foster care family to another. See HIGGINoTHAM, supra note 72,
at 50-51; Areen, supra note 57, at 912-14. Dispositions in neglect cases tend to overlook
the fact that foster care frequently is not superior to family care, even in a problem family
environment, and that many children who enter the foster care system do not eventually
return to their parents' home. See generally LNDSEY, supra note 4, at 48-59.
Second, public funding policies have discouraged keeping children and their natural
parents together, at a high cost to children and their families as well as to taxpayers. As
Judge Justine Polier described:
[Motes in the aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) program receive
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The intrusion on family privacy in neglect cases is constitutionally justified
by the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children. But
when the typical method of intervention is the removal of the child from the
parents' care, and the effect of that intervention habitually puts the child at
greater risk of harm, the state's action does not further its avowed purpose-
protecting the safety and well-being of children. It cannot be said to be acting
in the child's best interest, nor to be properly fulfilling its parens patriae role.
And, a prior, if the state's action does not protect children, but in fact
increases the likelihood of their harm, the extent of its intrusion on family
privacy is unwarranted.
This is not to suggest that the state does not have a continuing
responsibility to protect the well-being of poor children. To the contrary, since
the state has traditionally defined its role as parens patriae as one of ultimate
protectors of children's welfare, it is obliged in the proper exercise of that role
to devise constructive alternatives for the protection of all children including,
perhaps especially, those children whose parents are economically unable to
provide for their proper care. But it is constrained in the proper discharge of
that duty by the right of family privacy. It must develop alternative means of
intervention that will protect the child without undermining family ties any
further than necessary to accomplish that goal. 7 6 It is this duty to protect the
child when coupled with the right of family integrity that forms the basis for a
limited theory of assistance entitlement.
If a child is receiving inadequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care and
the like-if the child is neglected-the state, as it has defined its parens patriae
power, has an affirmative obligation to intervene in the family on the child's
behalf. Interference in the family is justified if it protects the child from harm.
Thus, the form of intervention must be based on a determination of what would
be in the child's best interest. However, it must also be narrowly tailored so as
to accomplish the state's objective with the least intrusion on the fundamental
privacy right of the family unit. This balancing of competing interests requires
on average less than $1 a day for each child. If we find the home is inadequate, that the
mother is unable to cope with the problems of so many children, we remove the child to
the home of a stranger or a series of strangers, paying from public funds up to $7 a day
for the child's care. If the child is removed to an institution, the institution is paid up to
$14 a day. Finally, if the child becomes emotionally disturbed, payments from public
funds may range from $10 to $25 a day. Thus, the further the child is removed from his
family, the more we are ready to pay for his support.
Justine Poller, The Invisible Legal Rights of the Poor, 12 CHILDREN 215, 218 (1965); see
also Areen, supra note 57, at 915.76 Removal of a child from parental custody may be necessary in some cases, but it
ought not be routinely employed without consideration of other forms of intervention.
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consideration of the available alternatives. The state ought not continually
interfere with the integrity of poor families, ostensibly for the purpose of
protecting children from harm, by imposing an action that routinely puts such
children at greater jeopardy.
Since the child's interest is, presumably, best served in the care and
custody of his or her parents, and alternatives available outside the family do
not better protect the child from harm,77 the state may best succeed in
safeguarding the child's welfare by preserving the family intact and assisting it
in achieving some measure of economic security. By so doing, the state meets
its obligation as parens patriae in a manner that causes only minimal intrusion
on family bonds. Thus, in the absence of a redefinition of the state's traditional
parens patriae role, I would argue that the state has, at the very least, an
affirmative obligation to provide some minimal assistance to poor families with
children prior to removal of the children from their parents. For the child who
is receiving inadequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care because of
parental poverty, the state is compelled to intervene on its behalf, but the most
effective and least intrusive form of intervention is likely to be economic
assistance to the child within the family, i.e., to the family unit.
I would argue further that since the obligation to provide assistance arises
from the state's common law duty toward children, it indeed exists at a point
prior to the point of removal. Other forms of intercession in the family, though
short of removal, are nonetheless intrusive on family privacy.78 Yet, as parens
patriae the state is obliged to intervene to protect the neglected child. The
method employed in satisfaction of the common law duty must be tempered by
the constitutional constraint. The state should apply the least intrusive manner
of intervention available that will enable it to effectively accomplish its
objective. Arguably, in cases of neglect, the state, therefore, may be similarly
obliged to provide some minimal economic assistance to the child within the
family unit prior to the imposition of other more intrusive forms of intervention
short of removal, such as in-home supervision.
IV. PARENS PATRAE, FAMILY INTEGRITY, AND WELFARE REFORM
What impact might consideration of the intersection of the common law
parens patriae doctrine and the constitutional family privacy doctrine have on
current efforts at welfare reform? Although the social welfare system has, over
the last three decades, all but eliminated poverty among the elderly, children
77 Studies have shown that foster care is often more dangerous than the home the
children are removed from. LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 58.
78 See supra note 55.
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have not fared as well. Child poverty rates have remained consistently at high
levels and have continued to escalate over time.79 At this writing, welfare
reform legislation is currently under consideration in both the U.S. House and
Senate which contain as a central component the discontinuation of the federal
guarantee of assistance to all eligible Americans. s° Preliminary studies indicate
that millions of additional children could be pushed into poverty if these
legislative initiatives are enacted in their current form.81 Some states have
begun a similar process of substantially curtailing state aid to poor families,
likely with similar long-term effects.8 2
The prevailing view of the constitutionally protected right to family
integrity is that it is a right to noninterference by the state in family matters
79 See supra note 74; see also Daniel Patrick Moynilhan, Towards a Post Industrial
Social Policy, 71 FAM. iN Soc'y 51-56 (1990); LNDSEY, supra note 4, at 189-228.80 Current House and Senate versions of welfare reform legislation replace the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program with a block grant, or direct cash payment, of
federal funds to the states, thereby ending the present system under which the federal
government matches state spending on welfare and any eligible poor person is guaranteed
benefits. The federal government estimates that nearly a fifth of the children receiving
benefits in 1994, or 157,000 children, would eventually be ineligible. States could deny
cash benefits to unwed teen mothers and deny additional benefits for children born to
women already on welfare. See Barbara Vobejda, Senate Passes Welfare Overhaul; ainton
Urges House to Go Along, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at Al, A4; How Congress Plans to
Balance the Budget, WASH. POsT, Nov. 21, 1995, at A15.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that the Senate bill,
which also substantially restricts benefits to the elderly and disabled under the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, would increase by 25% the "poverty gap" i.e., the
qualitative and quantitative extent of poverty in the nation. If enacted Congress' budget bill
would permit only 35% of the 900,000 disabled children who currently draw full SSI
benefits to continue to do so; 15% would be cut off entirely. See How Congress Plans to
Balance the Budget, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21, 1995, at A15.
There are also proposals in Congress significantly decreasing funding to the food stamp
program. Unlike the AFDC Program or SSI, for which one must be a single mother or
elderly or disabled, respectively, to qualify, the food stamp program is open to anyone
whose income is low enough. It acts, in effect, as a national income floor of sorts. See Food
Stomnps, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1995, at A22; Ann Devroy, As Effect of Welfare Reform Bills
Emerge, So Do Qidcs, WAH. POST, Nov. 9, 1995, at Al, Al0-A11.
81 The child poverty rate is estimated to increase from 14.6% to 16.1%, resulting in an
additional 1 million children below the poverty line if current versions of federal welfare
reform bills are enacted. See Judith Havemann & Ann Devroy, Cinton Agrees to New
Welfare Study, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1995, at A4.
82 See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, All Eyes on Virginia's Welfare Guinea Pig: Culpeper
Officials Opimistic as Region Begins Governor's Effort to Overhaul the System, WASH.
POST, June 4, 1995, atB1.
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absent a compelling state interest in preventing criminal behavior8 3 or
protecting children from harm. 84 It is a fundamental right that may not be
abridged by the state without a compelling reason, even when the intent is well-
meaning 85 But as parens patriae the government can, despite the importance
of the rights of family privacy and parental autonomy, impinge upon those
rights in order to protect children. It can require parents to feed, clothe, shelter
and otherwise properly care for their children.86 Afortiori, the responsibility of
the parents notwithstanding, because government has traditionally defined its
role as that of the ultimate protector of children's welfare, the state owes a duty
to the child who, by virtue of parental poverty, receives inadequate food,
clothing, shelter and medical care. Under current social welfare policy the state
has offered modest assistance to some needy children through public assistance
programs such as AFDC. But, the state has typically sought to satisfy its
responsibility to the neglected child through intervention in the family to
remove the child from the care of his or her impoverished parents, and to place
him or her into foster care. Significant increases in the number of poor families
will, undoubtedly, have a direct impact on the ability of child welfare and
social services systems to respond to the needs of neglected children. As a
practical matter, with nearly a half million children in an already overburdened
and inadequate foster care system, most for reasons of poverty, and with the
number of poor children increasing, removal of neglected children from
parental custody to foster care can no longer be the state's primary response to
poverty-induced child neglect.87 From a constitutional perspective, unless
removal of neglected children can be shown, as a general matter, to accomplish
its purpose of enhancing the well-being of such children, such continued
intrusion into poor families can no longer be justified. A priori, if the state is to
effectively satisfy its traditional obligation as parens patriae in a way that
comports with existing family privacy doctrine, a qualitative change is called
for in the way in which society understands and responds to poverty and in the
way it seeks to satisfy its obligation to its children.
The current societal approach to the needs of the poor is an outgrowth of
83 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
84 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
85 See supra notes 15-16.
86 See supra note 54.
87 Nearly half of all foster children move from one foster home to another in the same
year; most foster children remain in foster care until they are adults and are never returned
to their biological parents' homes; 3 % of foster children experience abuse or neglect in their
foster families; although the number of foster care placements has been increasing, the
number of qualified foster parents has been decreasing. CHILDREN's DEFENSE FUND, THE
STATE OF AMERICA'S CILDREN 62-63 (1992).
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various, often inaccurate or incomplete, assumptions including a view of
poverty as largely a private matter-the consequence of the individual
shortcomings of the poor.8 8 This perception has allowed us to condemn the
poor for their plight and to ignore the impact of parental poverty on children.8 9
But when millions of poor children continue to exist in an affluent society,
society must begin to alter its view from one of poverty as a private matter to
poverty as a civic concern. To be truly effective, any reform of the public
welfare system must leave more children better off than under the existing
system. Welfare policies should be designed to ensure that families, both single
and two-parent families, possess the minimal income necessary to adequately
care for their children. 90 Economic support for poor children cannot be
conditioned entirely upon the actions of their parents over which they have no
control. Though encouraging greater work force participation and self
sufficiency are laudatory goals, public assistance programs designed to address
88 For an interesting discussion of the conceptualization of the poor into categories of
"deserving poor" versus "undeserving poor" for purposes of the development of public
assistance policies and programs, see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY
120-203; see also supra notes 53-54.
89 See generally LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 208-28; CHLDREN'S DiENSE FuND, supra
note 1, at xx-xxiv. This perception underlies current reform proposals in Congress that
condition a child's benefit on increased labor force participation, self-sufficiency, and other
modified parental behaviors, which has the net effect of trying to motivate the parent's
actions by denying adequate support to the child.
90 Christopher Jencks has suggested that a reasonable way to go about this would be
through creation of a system of government financed "fringe benefits" in lieu of the existing
welfare system. This system would concentrate on helping all parents, in both single and
two-parent families, who work in low-wage jobs. He suggests that such a program might
include support in the form of: extra cash to parents who work at low-income jobs through
the Earned Income Credit, with a large credit available for families with more children; tax
credits for childcare expenses when the parents work; universal health care insurance with
premiums tied to income; a tax credit for housing for working parents; and, mortgage
subsidies for working parents who buy homes in low-income neighborhoods, in order to
stabilize those neighborhoods. JENCKS, supra note 88, at 232-35.
A second commentator, Duncan Lindsey, has suggested a universal "guaranteed child
exemption," available to working parents, both lone parents and couples. Working parents
would declare the number of dependent children in their households. Based on that
declaration, the parent, whether working fill or part time, would be paid the value of the
exemption through reduced payroll deductions. Parents who were unemployed would
receive regular cash payments up to the value of the exemption. See LINDSEY, supra note 4,
at 245-51.
It is not the intent of this Article to formulate a proposal for welfare reform and it does
not attempt to do so. Further, it neither endorses nor rejects the suggested reform measures
of the commentators described herein, but merely recounts their suggestions for the reader.
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those objectives must not undermine efforts to alleviate child poverty in the
attempt to promote parental self responsibility.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY "ASSISTANCE ENTITLEMENT" TALK NOW?.
At the outset of this Article I noted that debate about a right to minimum
assistance is not new.91 The twenty-five years since the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Dandridge v. Widliams, 92 have seen such notions largely dismissed
as counter to traditional constitutional doctrine and philosophy. Given present
social attitudes and the conservative makeup of the current Supreme Court one
might reasonably doubt whether that view is likely to change in the near future.
So, one might ask, why revisit the issue of assistance entitlements for the poor
now and what does this Article add to the deliberations?
To address the second part of the question first, this Article presents a new
theoretical dimension, grounded in substantive due process and traditional
common law doctrine, to arguments for a limited assistance entitlement. Still,
why reconsider the entitlement issue at all?
One answer is that the number of poor families continues to rise and no
downturn in the numbers seems imminent. 93 Child poverty rates in this country
are particularly alarming. 94 The costs of child poverty to society is measurable
in terms of both human potential and real dollars.95 It is ironic that the United
States, with one of the largest and most expensive child welfare systems in the
industrialized world, also has one of the highest rates of child poverty. 96 If
91 See supra text accompanying notes 13-33.
92 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
93 See supra note 81.
94 Families with children are nearly 3 times more likely to be poor than families
without children. And younger families with children (i.e., families headed by someone
under 30) are nearly 6 times more likely to be poor than childless families overall. See
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at xx.
95 Poverty stacks the odds against children before birth; it decreases their chances of
being born healthy and of normal birthweight or of surviving. Low-income children are two
times more likely to die from birth defects; three times more likely to die from all causes
combined; four times more likely to die in fires; five times more likely to die from
infectious diseases and parasites; and, six times more likely to die of other diseases.
Future losses to the economy resulting from the effects of just one year of poverty for
14.6 million children (the current estimate of the number of children living in poverty)
reach as high as $177 billion. If the costs associated with higher rates of unemployment,
poor worker health, and inadequate academic skills are eliminated, the estimated annual
costs of child poverty is still between $36 billion and $99 billion. CHILDREN's DEFENSE
FUND, supra note 1, at xvii, xix, 99-116; see supra note 72.96 The United States and Canada have the costliest and most extensive child welfare
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child poverty continues unabated at its current rate, the wealth, the very future
of this country as represented by its children, will be decimated. Thus, this
may be a particularly propitious time to seriously reconsider our choices and
priorities as a society.
Perhaps another answer is one suggested by Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky. 97 It is particularly important that scholars and others continue to
make a case for an entitlement to survival resources, especially now, because
those views are almost entirely absent from the current Supreme Court. Our
constitutional history demonstrates that academic writing of one era can
influence constitutional doctrines in the next. 98 And, as Professor Daan
Braveman suggests, apart from responses of the federal judiciary, state courts
might be persuaded to independently find these rights under state
constitutions. 9
But perhaps the best rationale for reconsidering this issue is suggested by
recalling the words of Franklin Roosevelt, "The test of our progress is not
whether we add to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we
provide enough for those who have too little." 100
systems and the highest rate of children in poverty among the industrialized nations. See
LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 189-228. Such high poverty rates are not an inevitable result of
modem industrialized society. Other industriaized nations with fewer resources and similar
economic and social problems as those of the United States have lower child poverty rates.
American children are three times as likely to be poor as British children, four times more
likely to be poor than French children and seven to thirteen times more likely to be poor
than German, Dutch or Swedish children. See CHILDRN's DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at
XX.
97 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Maldng the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimwn
Eniement 44 MERCER L. REV. 525 (1993).
98 I at 526.
99 See Braveman, supra note 3.
100
But here is the challenge to our democracy:-In this nation I see tens of
millions of its citizens--a substantial part of its whole population-who at this very
moment are denied the greater part of what the very lowest standards of today call
necessities of life.
I see millions of families trying to live on incomes so meager that the pall of family
disaster hangs over them day by day.
I see millions whose daily lives in city and on farm continue under conditions
labeled indecent by a so-called polite society half a century ago.
I see millions denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better their lot
and the lot of thei children.
I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory and by
their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions.
I see one-tird of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.
1996]
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It is not in despair that I paint you this picture. I paint it for you in hope-because
the nation, seeing and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out .... The
test of our progress is not %*heer we add to the abundance of those who have much; it
is uhether we provide enough for those whzo have too lik.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, (Jan. 20, 1937) in VrrAL SPEECHES OF
THE DAY (1936-37), at 227 (emphasis added).
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